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INTRODUCTION
A new Federal Reserve rule prevents many stay-at-home
mothers and homemakers from opening sole-account credit cards
or extending their existing credit lines.' The rule, promulgated
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ("Board") in an
effort to implement the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009 ("CARD Act"),2 requires card issuers
to consider only a person's independent income, and not the
household's income, when underwriting credit cards. However,
this "ability to pay" rule impacts not only young adults-the
intended target of the CARD Act-but also, problematically, an
even larger group of people': non-income earning spouses, largely
comprised of stay-at-home mothers and homemakers.4
While the Board's rule does not necessarily reflect any
particular or reasoned assault on stay-at-home mothers or
homemakers, it does indicate the vulnerability of certain family
members in a new era of credit-tightening and budget-cutting.
In responding to the economic crisis, therefore, lawmakers should
be mindful of the negative or unintended consequences of their
legislation on the family unit and its members.'
I See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
12 C.F.R. § 226.51 (2012); see infra Parts LC, II, and note 131. An iteration of this
issue previously arose in the debate regarding the propriety of a bride's decision to
keep her maiden name and the consequent impact on her credit history. See, e.g.,
Esther Suarez, Note, A Woman's Freedom to Choose Her Surname: Is It Really a
Matter of Choice?, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 233, 236-37 (1997).
2 123 Stat. 1734.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, at tbl. FG2, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html.
I See infra Part II.B. It has been argued that women, non-working spouses,
military members, military spouses, and retired people would have more trouble
accessing the credit card market under the Board's "ability to pay" rule. Manley
Williams & Sara E. Emley, CARD Act's Ability to Pay Proposal Ignites Public Policy
Debate, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1429 (2011).
5 However, there are reasons to believe that Congress did not intend the CARD
Act to hold negative consequences for women and that the Board's "ability to pay"
rule is not a permissible construction of the statute. See infra Parts I.C, III.A.1.
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Women's interests, in particular, must be considered in any
discussion sensitive to the undesirable consequences of economic
legislation.6 Women continue to earn less than their male
counterparts and have historically lacked contractual rights in
economic matters. Many of the inequities women encounter,
including the newest one that would bar many of them from the
credit card market, have stemmed from their erratic presence in
the labor market due to childbearing and rearing.8
One solution has been the law's frequent treatment of the
family as a single economic unit, which has minimized the
consequences of a spouse's decision to enter or exit the labor
market.' This unified treatment of the family has been one of the
underlying principles of many fields of law, as well as one of the
benefits of marriage. Prominent areas of law that conform to this
principle are tax law,o trusts and estates law,n matrimonial
property law,12 and divorce law'-all of which recognize spouses
as one economic unit. 4 Such treatment is not to pity or patronize
the non-income earning spouse; instead, it is the result of the
recognition of the non-financial contribution of a non-income
6 See Bryce Covert, The Double-Edged Sword of Credit Cards for Women and
Minorities, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2011, 11:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryce-covert/the-double-edged-sword-
of_b_836499.html ("Indeed, minorities and women have historically been shut out of
the products others take for granted. And this problem was one of the excuses used
by the industry to deregulate and 'democratize' credit. But as access to credit and
banking expanded, so did predatory practices. As the CFPB tries to rein them in, it
risks shutting people out all over again.").
See infra Part II.B.
See id.
See infra Part II.A.
10 The incentives in the U.S. Tax Code are for married couples to file their
federal taxes jointly instead of separately. Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not To
Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 921, 927 n.27, 928 (2009).
11 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
12 The general family law principle is that a spouse's income is marital property.
Margaret Ryznar, All's Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The
Fairness of Property Division in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, 86
N.D. L. REV. 115, 125 (2010); see also infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
13 See Ryznar, supra note 12.
"1 See infra Part II.A; see also Suarez, supra note 1, at 236.
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earning spouse, as well as society's respect for the couple's
decision to share an income and society's decision not to interfere
in a married couple's financial arrangement."
The Board's "ability to pay" rule, on the other hand, does not
treat spouses as a single economic unit. Instead, the rule creates
consequences for foregoing an independent income during
marriage: The non-income-earning spouse may not open a sole-
account credit card, while the income-earning spouse may do so."
Although the new rule is consistent with mortgage lending
policies that do not permit reliance on an income whose earner
has not signed for the loan, this similarity is less necessary given
that credit card loans are smaller and more incremental loans
than mortgages." Furthermore, in limiting credit in this way,
the Board's "ability to pay" rule was not rooted in any empirical
data suggesting that non-income earners are higher risk
creditors. 8  On the contrary, it has been suggested that non-
income earners are the fiscal managers of the household and a
major purchasing power. 9
The practical implications of the Board's "ability to pay" rule
are as problematic as the theoretical concerns regarding spousal
inequity. Specifically, financial inclusion is essential for any
adult," especially in emergency situations when a spouse needs
to leave an abusive partner.2 ' Even in an amicable marriage
separation, the non-income spouse may need to rely on marital
15 Indeed, many spouses elect to income-share. See Williams & Emley, supra
note 4, at 1423-24.
16 Access to Credit for Spouses Who Work in the Home, INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS
OF AM. (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Access to Credit for Spouses Who Work in the
Home], available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test060612.pdf.
1" See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Apr. 19,
2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20110419a.htm.
18 See Access to Credit for Spouses Who Work in the Home, supra note 16 ("A
substantive change such as this should be supported by consumer testing, industry
outreach, and data sufficient to demonstrate that it is in the best interest of
consumers.").
19 See infra notes 193-98, 236 and accompanying text.
20 Judith L. Ritter, Growin' Up: An Assessment of Adult Self-Image in Clincial
Law Students, 44 AKRON L. REV. 137, 144 (2011) (noting that emerging adults say
that adulthood is characterized by financial independence).
1 An abused spouse may decide to stay with an abusive spouse for financial
reasons. Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in India: Economic Abuse
and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretation To Promote Women's Fundamental
Rights, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 200-201 (2006); see also infra Part II.B.
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credit before the marital assets are divided or become liquid. 2
During marriage, meanwhile, people with military spouses need
access to credit card markets.
Perhaps most importantly, financial independence is self-
perpetuating, with the proper use of a credit card being
recognized as an important step in building credit. In a society
with consistently high divorce rates, it is important for both
spouses to build their credits separately, even if they are
managing only one income during the marriage.2 6
Of course, financial independence must be earned, and credit
cards are risky for those unable to be financially independent.
Credit card interest can be high, terms can be complicated, and
debt can overwhelm those unable to pay.28 For many of these
reasons, Congress passed the CARD Act to protect consumers.
The Board's resulting bar on many non-income earners from the
credit market, however, is a surprising interpretation because
the Act's strictest credit restriction targets young people under
the age of twenty-one rather than non-income-earning spouses."
22 See generally Ryznar, supra note 12. In some divorce cases, the income-
earning spouse may be court-ordered to pay for the legal fees of a non-income-
earning spouse. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-324 (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.14 (West 2012).
21 Press Release, Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, Capito Opening
Statement at Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing (June 6, 2012), available at
http://capito.house.gov/press-releases/capito-opening-statement-at-financial-services-
subcommittee-hearing8/.
24 See Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased Regulation of
Credit Cards for College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 117 (2005) ("[Tihe use
of a credit card builds a credit history and credit score which are required to qualify
for other types of credit such as a mortgage or a car loan."). Conversely, the improper
use of a credit card lowers one's credit rating. See Creola Johnson, Maxed Out
College Students: A Call To Limit Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 215 (2005).
25 See, e.g., Marriage and Divorce, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm/ (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
26 But see Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1425 ("[M]any consumer
advocates have warned against individuals combining their credit profiles.").
27 See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Katherine M. Porter, Life After Debt: Understanding the Credit
Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2010).
29 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see infra Part
I.C.
30 See infra Parts I.C, III.A.1.
915
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
This Article therefore argues that the Board's rule should
not seek to influence, penalize, or interfere with a household's
decision to income-share between spouses. This argument
applies to all non-income-earning spouses-regardless of
gender-even though the rule, despite being facially neutral,
disproportionately affects women.3 1  There are additional legal
infirmities plaguing the rule, including vulnerabilities under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 2
All of these considerations should be at the forefront of any
reevaluation of the rule, especially as pressure mounts for the
newly established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB") to review the rule after it took jurisdiction over such
matters on July 21, 2011.11
Part I of this Article begins by considering the origins of the
Board's rule-reviewing the legal and economic frameworks
governing them. Part II then examines the position of families
and women in this framework, noting that many other fields of
law take an opposite approach and treat spouses as a single
economic unit. Part III, in addition to highlighting the
constitutional concerns regarding the Board's rule, concludes
that there is no value in barring women from the credit market-
only high costs-and argues that the amended rule should
instead recognize the non-income-earning spouse's financial
participation in the household.
" See infra Part II.B.
32 See 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also infra Part III.A.1.
3 See An Examination of the Federal Reserve's Final Rule on the CARD Act's
"Abilty To Repay" Requirement, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 5-6 (2012) (statement
of Gail Hillebrand, Assoc. Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau) [hereinafter Testimony
of Gail Hillebrand], available at http//financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-
133.pdf; infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. However, recently filed lawsuits
against the CFPB-which remains relatively controversial-could decrease the
agency's power over the Board's rule. See Emmanuel Olaoye, Suit Against U.S.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Could Force It To Define Limits to Its
Authority, Says Banking Industry Lawyer, REUTERS (June 29, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/06/29/suit-against-u-s-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-could-force-it-to-define-limits-to-its-authority-
says-banking-industry-lawyer/; see also C. Boyden Gray & Jim R. Purcell, Why
Dodd-Frank Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2012, at A17, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577480451892603234.ht
ml?mod=googlenews-wsj (discussing the constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010), which legislatively underpins the CFPB).
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I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE RULE
Given the law's frequent treatment of the family as a single
economic unit, as well as the negative impact of the Board's
"ability to pay" rule on many women,34 it is difficult to justify
barring married non-income earners from the credit card market.
One compelling explanation for the Board's rule-which does
exactly this-is that the Board misstated and misinterpreted
congressional intent in the CARD Act, which aims to protect
young consumers in the credit card market. 35 Before considering
this legislation, it is helpful to consider the credit crisis
prompting it.
A. The Credit Crisis
The Board's "ability to pay" rule stems from the financial
reform prompted by the "Great Recession."36  This recession,
which began in 2007, has been among the most devastating
economic crises of the past hundred years." Unemployment
hovered at nine percent,38 and families affected by unemployment
lost their homes in foreclosures, as well as their savings when the
stock market lost its value.
34 See infra Part II.
35 See infra Parts I.C, III.A.1.
36 See Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States' Rights: Federalism, Private
Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIz. L. REV. 1161, 1171 n.36
(2010).
3 See Andrew J. Ceresney et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit
Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 225 (2009) ("Many
commentators have remarked that 2008 will be known as the modern financial
system's annus horribilis."). It has been called "the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression." Id. at 228-29 (quoting IMF's Financial General Plots Strategy to
End the Credit Crisis, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 14, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/2788081IMFs-
fmancial-general-plots-strategy-to-end-the-credit-crisis.html.
3 See, e.g., Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the Law, Protecting Absent
Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage
Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1393 & n.42
(2010); Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
LNS14000000 (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
39 See Kazakes, supra note 38, at 1392-93 (footnotes omitted) ("In the second
quarter of 2009, the national rate of residential mortgages either delinquent or in
foreclosure rose to a record-high 13.16 percent, or more than one in eight households
with a mortgage. In total, out of the approximately 51 million mortgaged residential
units in the United States, approximately 2.15 million foreclosures were completed
917
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Underpinning this recession was the credit crisis caused by
excessive extension of credit in both the commercial and
consumer fields, leading to defaults and the consequent
tightening of credit.4 0 The catalysts of the credit crisis included
"[t]he proliferation of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages, the
ensuing pandemic of defaults in the subprime sector, and the
collapse of the housing market."' Many people were therefore
able to obtain credit too easily-often against their houses-even
when they could not afford it. They then defaulted on their
loans, drying up credit.42 A major source of consumer loans is the
credit card market, considered next.
B. The History of the Credit Card Market
Credit cards have been described as "one of the great
innovations of the twentieth century,"4 3 whose benefits include
easiness, flexibility, and the opportunity for better financial
management.4 4 At the same time, credit cards have also been
seen as risky for consumers due to their high interest rates and
propensity for encouraging consumers to spend more or live
beyond their means.4 s
from July 2007 to October 2009. Looking to the horizon, foreclosure starts are
projected to reach eight to thirteen million by 2013.").
40 See, e.g., Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed
Regulatory Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 430.
41 Ceresney et al., supra note 37, at 230.
42 See Guynn, supra note 40 ("Although the final word on who or what caused
the financial crisis has not been written, this financial crisis has followed a similar
pattern that almost every other mania, panic, and crash has followed before this one.
Some combination of cheap credit and excessive optimism creates a bubble in asset
prices, typically in real estate or commodities. Eventually this bubble pops, resulting
in a collapse in asset prices, a spike in interest rates, extreme uncertainty about
'true' asset values, and excessive pessimism ... . The recent global financial crisis
was triggered by a collapse in U.S. real estate prices at a time when U.S.
households, corporations, and financial institutions had built up huge levels of debt
leverage.").
4 Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the
Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 515 (2005).
" See id. at 524-28.
6 See Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card
Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 426 (2009) ("Several studies have shown a correlation
between using credit cards and spending more.").
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Credit card lending has resulted in substantial consumer
debt for many Americans.46 There are currently "1.22 billion
credit cards in the United States," with the average person
possessing five credit cards.4 8 By the end of 2009, credit card
debt and other unsecured revolving consumer credit owed in the
United States totaled $866 billion.4 9 This represented "a five-fold
increase in just three decades."o
The modern credit card grew out of merchant credit schemes
for fuel or department store purchases.5 1 The mainstream use of
credit cards began in 1958, when Bank of America and American
Express issued their first credit cards.52 Prior to their broad
availability, credit cards were developed to accommodate well-to-
do consumers traveling on corporate expense accounts.53
Since then, over the course of the last fifty years, credit card
companies have become quite successful at marketing. In 2008,
for example, Mastercard launched its Diamond Credit Card,
which costs $1,000 per year to maintain and has a $50,000 credit
limit.54 It was inlaid with a 0.02 carat diamond and laced with
gold. 5 Illustrating the marketing nuances, the card had a
picture of a winged horse for men or a peacock for women. 6
Credit cards were also successfully marketed to the less
wealthy, such as college students. Credit card companies would
attain students' contact information and send them pre-screened
4 John Infranca, Safer than the Mattress? Protecting Social Security Benefits
from Bank Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1127, 1133 (2009).
4 Kathryn A. Wood, Note, Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009: Protecting Young Consumers or Impinging on Their Financial
Freedom?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159, 159 (2010).
4 Id.
49 Song Han et al., Credit Supply to Personal Bankruptcy Filers: Evidence from
Credit Card Mailings 1 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper 29, 2011),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2011/201129/201129pap.pdf.
so Id.
5' SATYAJIT DAS, EXTREME MONEY: MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE CULT
OF RISK 71 (2011).
52 Id.
" See Littwin, supra note 45, at 427-28.
14 DAS, supra note 51, at 72.
56 Id.
6 Id.
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credit card offers."7 They would also come to campus and offer
free gifts, such as pizzas or hats, to entice students to sign up for
credit cards."
In the 2000's, public concern mounted about the targeting of
college students by the credit card industry." Fifty-six percent of
students opened their first credit card at the age of eighteen, and,
by their final year in university, ninety-one percent had at least
one credit card, and fifty-six percent had at least four credit
cards." Upon graduation, students' credit card debt ranged from
$2,200 to $4,100.61 Over seventy percent of students retained
their first credit card beyond university.62
Partially due to this successful marketing,63 credit cards
have become widely used,64 especially among students." This is
a problem mainly to the extent that people may not be able to
afford their monthly balances. This kind of credit is expensive,
and it is easy to ruin a credit score through the improper use of
credit cards, especially for college students who may not
understand the terms. As these concerns became increasingly
public during the recession,67 Congress turned to legislating on
the topic.
" Regina Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C. BANKING
INST. 287, 296 (2010).
58 Id. at 292 & n.47 (noting that many students used to receive free t-shirts and
pizza for engaging with credit card companies).
" See, e.g., Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What's Your Score?
Educating College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
401, 401 (2005) ("Observers have expressed concern about burgeoning credit card
debt loads which, when combined with already-high student loan burdens, can force
students into quitting college, declaring bankruptcy, and even, in a few tragic cases,
suicide."); Johnson, supra note 24, at 193-94 (noting that some students may be
driven to suicide by their credit card debts). The Federal Reserve did not adequately
foresee this problem. See infra note 76.
60 Wood, supra note 47, at 161.
61 Id. at 159-60.
62 Id. at 160.
6 See Han et al., supra note 49, at 10-11 ("According to the aggregate statistics
obtained from Mintel, monthly credit card mail solicitations plummeted from a peak
of 600 million in 2006 to just 100 million in 2008. By the start of our sample,
solicitations had recovered to roughly 300 million per month.").
64 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
65 Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1418.
" See supra note 59.
67 Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1418. ("Credit card companies were
among the chief targets of consumer and media criticism during the peak of the
credit crisis. They were accused of perceived wrongs ranging from increases in
920 [Vol. 86:911
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C. The Resulting Legal Framework
As a response to the economic recession,' Congress targeted
the financial services industry, which was thought to have been
extending credit too easily.69 The resulting legislative reform of
the financial services industry was sweeping, aiming to prevent
future credit crises created by lax underwriting. 0
As part of the financial reform, Congress took aim at the
credit card industry72 in the CARD Act," which President Barack
interest rates to undesired reductions in credit limits and high fees for overlimit
spending and late payments.").
6 See supra Parts I.A-B.
69 See Ceresney et al., supra note 37, at 227 (underscoring fraudulent lending
practices); David Smith, The Credit Card Act of 2009, 47 HOUs. LAw. 28, 29 (2010)
(noting that Congress was reacting to pressure to "do something"); Charles K.
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (suggesting
"[flinancial regulation is often reactive.").
7o See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and the Local in the
Financial Crisis of 2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the
Regulation of Consumer Credit in the United States and the European Union, 26 J.L.
& RELIGION 173, 183 (2010) ("Indeed, the perception that lax regulation of consumer
credit contributed to the explosion in subprime credit that precipitated the global
economic crisis has led to significant federal re-regulation of consumer credit."); see
also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on
an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in
Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1482 (2010); infra
note 71. This expansion of government regulation has not been without controversy.
See Robert Higgs, Culminating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, and
the Current Surge of Government's Size, Scope, and Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 531, 531 (2010).
71 Included in these financial reforms was also the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
See Schiltz, supra note 70, at 183 ("The more recent Dodd-Frank law sets the
framework for even more significant substantive federal regulation of consumer
credit, the exact scope of which will unfold gradually over the next few years."). For
further background on the Dodd-Frank law, see generally Linda Singer et al.,
Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection
Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J.
CONSUMER & COM. L. 2 (2010). For a discussion of potential future legislation
regulating financial services, see Michael Edwards, The Changing Landscape of
Financial Services Law in 2009: Federal Preemption, Credit Rating Agency Liability,
and Regulatory Reform Legislation, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 27, 31-32 (2010).
72 See supra Part I.B. For a criticism of the regulation of the credit card market,
see generally Muris, supra note 43.
7 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Obama signed into law on May 22, 2009.74 To carry out the
CARD Act and its amendments, Congress had assigned power,
through the Truth in Lending Act's Regulation Z, to the Federal
Reserve Board to issue such rules and publish such model forms
as it considered necessary. The Board's interpretation of the
CARD Act yielded its "ability to pay" rule."
1 See Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1079,1087 (2010) (noting three failed Congressional attempts in passing the CARD Act).
For further background on the CARD Act, see generally Mary Beth Matthews, The
Credit CARD Act of 2009-What Is It, and What Does It Do?, 2010 ARK. L. NOTES 65.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a)
(2012). Such an assignment is typical, but some commentators were concerned by
the provision of so much power to the Federal Reserve Board without Congressional
oversight. Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy over Systemic Risk Regulation, 35
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 823, 833 (2010); see also Schiltz, supra note 70, at 179 (noting
that the regulation of consumer credit had previously been a matter of primarily
state power). But see Modernizing Consumer Protection in the Financial Regulatory
System: Strengthening Credit Card Protections: Two ABI Members Testify Before
U.S. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Mar. 2009, at 10, 76 [hereinafter Modernizing Consumer Protection] ("Congress is
not well-suited for determining whether every innovation of the card industry should
be permitted or not . . . .").
7 Yet, the Federal Reserve had not been entirely successful in determining
which subgroups need protection in the credit card market. In 2001, for example,
Federal Reserve staff noted that bank examinations did not focus on college
students' credit cards because the banks typically examined the risk of the credit
card portfolio as a whole and did not examine subgroups of card holders--especially
at banks where the credit card portfolio was a minor portion of their financial
business. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER FINANCE: COLLEGE
STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 7 (2001), available at http*//www.gao.gov/new.items/
d01773.pdf. These officials further stated that college student credit card portfolios
have not been viewed as especially risky, even at banks whose primary business was
issuing credit cards. Id. But see Johnson, supra note 24, at 217-218 (suggesting that
credit card debt may contribute to the increase of young adult bankruptcies).
"Bankruptcy is becoming more common for young adults; the number of people
under the age of twenty-six who filed for bankruptcy tripled between 1995 and 2000.
According to Harvard University's Consumer Bankruptcy Project, approximately
100,000 debtors in their twenties filed for bankruptcy in 2001." Id. at 218 (footnote
omitted). Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve Board wants to restrict access to the
credit card market for non-income-earning spouses, despite no evidence that this
group is high-risk. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text.
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1. The Card Act
The Card Act aimed to increase the transparency of the
credit card industry and protect college students from predatory
lending." Specifically, title I of the CARD Act addressed
consumer protections," while title II enhanced consumer
disclosures.79  Title III sought to protect credit card consumers
under the age of twenty-oneso: Credit card companies could no
longer give gifts to students to sign up for credit cards on
campus," and universities had to disclose contracts signed with
credit card companies that gave access to students. Although
some commentators wanted more protections for young people,
title III was a major success compared to previous failed efforts
to protect college students from aggressive credit card lending,
which included U.S. Representative Louise Slaughter's bill on the
topic in 1999, as well as Senator Christopher Dodd's bill in
2000.81 Finally, title IV of the CARD Act concerned gift cards,8
while title V had miscellaneous provisions.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1650 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (outlining provisions for credit card
protections for college students); id. § 16931-1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see also
Schiltz, supra note 70, at 183 (noting that the CARD Act "imposed substantive
restrictions on the ability of credit card issuers to increase interest rates and to
impose late fees and over-limit fees, and restricts fees on subprime, low-limit credit
cards").
11 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, tit. I, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735-43 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
Id. tit. II, 123 Stat. at 1743-47.
8 Id. tit. III, 123 Stat. at 1747-54.
81 Id. tit. III, § 304, 123 Stat. at 1749.
82 Id.
3 It has been argued that the CARD Act does not fundamentally address the
problems surrounding young people's use of credit cards and that financial literacy
would be more helpful. Wood, supra note 47, at 183 ("Restricting young adult
ownership of credit cards only delays credit misuse; it does not solve it. The Act
should not be aimed at discouraging all use, but rather encouraging responsible
use."); see also Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson, Can States Tax National
Banks To Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 30 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 831, 844 (2007). But see Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 197-98 (2008) (noting that financial literacy may
worsen people's practices with credit cards). Others have supported the various
legislative efforts to curb aggressive lending to college students. See, e.g., Johnson,
supra note 24, at 216.
" Johnson, supra note 24, at 253-55.
8 See tit. IV, 123 Stat. at 1751-54.
* Id. tit. V, 123 Stat. at 1754-66.
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The CARD Act provisions that were most relevant to the
Board's "ability to pay" rule were the ones amending the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA").8 1 The particular amendments that served
as the foundation for the Board's "ability to pay" rule were the
following: (1) CARD Act section 301, which added section 127(c)
to TILA and (2) CARD Act section 109, which added section 150
to TILA." The Board's interpretation of these amendments
resulted in its "ability to pay" rule.
Importantly, section 301 of the CARD Act-which added
section 127(c) to TILA-is the only reference to a consumer's
"independent means" to pay, from which the Board's "ability to
pay" rule for everyone derives. 90 However, title III of the CARD
Act-entitled "Protection of Young Consumers"-explicitly
addresses only young consumers under the age of twenty-one.91
Specifically, the application for a credit card by a consumer under
twenty-one requires an appropriate cosigner, or "submission by
the consumer of financial information, including through an
application, indicating an independent means of repaying any
obligation arising from the proposed extension of credit in
connection with the account." 92
On the other hand, section 109 of the CARD Act-outside of
title III and therefore encompassing all consumers-adds section
150 to TILA and has no similar requirement for an independent
means of income.93 The key requirement here is a general ability
to pay:
A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any
consumer under an open end consumer credit plan, or increase
any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card
issuer considers the ability of the consumer to make the
required payments under the terms of such account.94
87 Id. §§ 109, 301, 123 Stat. at 1743, 1747; see also Williams & Emley, supra
note 4, at 1421. For Congressional testimony in support of the CARD Act, see
Modernizing Consumer Protection, supra note 75.
8 §§ 109, 301, 123 Stat. at 1743, 1747.
89 See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,458, 67,474 (Nov. 2, 2010), available at
httpJ/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-26515.pdf.
9 § 301, 123 Stat. at 1748.
91 Id. tit. III, 123 Stat. at 1747-48.
92 Id. § 301, 123 Stat. at 1748 (emphasis added).
93 Id. § 109, 123 Stat. at 1743.
9 Id.
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Given that the only instance of the "independent means" to
pay language is in title III of the CARD Act-which relates only
to young consumers under the age of twenty-one-Congress
intended to require an independent income only of credit card
applicants under the age of twenty-one. Congresswomen
Maloney and Slaughter, in their response to the Board,
confirmed that this was the intent of the CARD Act:
The original intent of the "ability to pay" requirement was to
ensure that underage consumers couldn't apply for credit cards
using their parents [sic] income without having a means on
their own to make payments on the card. Creating a uniform
standard for underage consumers and for spouses who do not
earn a salary goes beyond that intent. For this reason, we
believe that there should be two different standards for
assessing income, one for consumers under age 21 and one for
everyone else.95
In other words, the congressional intent of the CARD Act
was to protect young people from credit card costs risks, not to
bar non-income-earning spouses from the credit card market.
The Board conceded that Congress's use of the word
"independent" in TILA section 127(c)(8)(B)(ii) (added by section
310 of the CARD Act), but not in TILA section 150 (added by
section 109 of the CARD Act), could have been viewed as
establishing a different and "less stringent standard" for
household income when the consumer is over twenty-one years of
age.9 6 However, the Board rejected this interpretation:
TILA Section 150 requires card issuers to consider "the ability
of the consumer to make the required payments," which
indicates that Congress intended card issuers to base this
evaluation only on the ability of the consumer (or consumers)
applying for the account. Indeed, to the extent that TILA
Section 150 was intended to ensure that credit cards are not
issued to consumers who lack the ability to pay, it could be
inconsistent with that purpose to permit a card issuer to open a
credit card account for a consumer without income or assets
95 Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 12, 2011),
[hereinafter Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer
J. Johnson], available at http://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/
documents/financial/creditcards/20110112AbilitytoPayCommentFedLetter.pdf.
6 Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
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based on the income or assets of a spouse or other household
member (unless the consumer has an ownership interest in the
household income or assets).97
The Board therefore "concluded that it would be inconsistent
with the intent of the Credit Card Act for a card issuer to issue a
credit card to a consumer who does not have any income or
assets.""
In sum, the Board's interpretation of congressional intent in
the CARD Act was that the independent income of every
consumer was to be evaluated, not just that of young people. The
Board concluded that this "ability to pay" standard necessarily
excluded consideration of the consumer's spousal income and
assets in evaluating the consumer's ability to pay, regardless of
the consumer's age. This resulted in the bar on non-income-
earning spouses from the credit card market.
2. The Federal Reserve's "Ability To Pay" Rule
The Board proceeded to draft rules to implement its
interpretation of the CARD Act. On February 22, 2010 and June
29, 2010, the rules were published in the Federal Register,
amending Regulation Z's provisions that apply to open-end-not
home-secured--credit plans.99
Interestingly, in its initial rule on ability to pay, the Board
used the word "independent" in section 226.51(b) of Regulation Z,
but not in section 226.51(a), which could be interpreted "as
prohibiting consideration of household income with respect to
underage consumers but permitting it for other consumers."100 In
other words, the initial rule was perceived as having an "ability
to pay" standard focused only on young adults.
In November 2010, however, the Board announced
clarifications regarding the final rules, proposing to amend
specific portions of the regulations and the attendant official staff
commentary.' 0 In these clarifications, the Board noted that the
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,093, 44,093 (July 28, 2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-28/pdfl2010-18410.pdf; Truth in Lending,
75 Fed. Reg. 7657, 7722 (Feb. 22, 2010), available at httpj/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
FR-2010-02-22/pdflFR-2010-02-22.pdf.
10 Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
101 Id.
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difference in the use of the term "independent" in the two
subsections of section 226.51 was in fact due to the difference in
the legislative provisions being implemented, but that the result
was the same: Household income could not be considered for any
person. 0 2  Therefore, the Board clarified that the credit
standards for those under twenty-one years of age and those over
twenty-one were the same-an independent income was required
to apply for a credit card. Any difference in the Board's language
in the initial rule between these two groups was not intended to
establish two different "ability to pay" standards.
To this end, the Board, using its authority under TILA
section 105(a) and section 2 of the CARD Act, proposed amending
section 226.51 of its rules to require that "regardless of the
consumer's age, a card issuer must consider the consumer's
independent ability to make the required payments."os In other
words, only one "ability to pay" standard applied to everyone:
Spouses received no preferential financial treatment over
children; all were to be evaluated for credit only by their
individual income rather than by their household income.
Accordingly, section 226.51(a) of the Board's rules, which
requires credit card issuers to consider only a consumer's
individual ability to make the required payments, reflects the
provision in TILA section 150 as added by section 109 of the
CARD Act. 104 Meanwhile, section 226.51(b), which requires a
card issuer to acquire financial information indicating an
underage consumer has an independent ability to make the
payments, tracks TILA section 127(c)(8)(B)(ii), as added by
section 310 of the CARD Act.105
In accordance with this approach, the Board also proposed
revising comment 51(a)(1)-4 to its rules, clarifying that
consideration of the consumer's household income or assets
generally does not fulfill the requirement in section 226.51(a)(1),
which requires that a card issuer consider the consumer's
independent ability to pay.106 In practical terms, if the credit
102 Id. The differences in the statutory provisions are discussed supra Part I.C.1;
infra III.A.1.
103 Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
104 Id.
105 Id.
1os Id.
927
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [
card application asks an applicant to provide "household income,"
the card issuer would need to obtain additional information
about the consumer's independent income, which may include
contacting the consumer. 0 7 On the other hand, if the credit card
application asks only for "income"-instead of "household
income"--the card issuer may rely on the applicant's stated
income to issue credit, even if it inadvertently includes spousal
income: "[T]he comment would also clarify that, if a card issuer
requests on its application form that applicants provide their
income (without referring to household income), the card issuer
may rely on the information provided to satisfy the requirements
of § 226.51(a)."' The result is that credit card applications may
ask for income without specifying "independent" income, but may
not ask for "household income."
Perhaps because of these semantics, the Board noted that it
"is unaware of any evidence that card issuers who request
'income' or 'salary' extend less credit to married women who do
not work outside the home or to low-income families than issuers
that request 'household income.' "109 Nonetheless, the Board did
recognize the impact of the rule on non-income-earning spouses,
stating in its clarifications:
The Board acknowledges that the proposed amendments to
§ 226.51 and its commentary could prevent a consumer without
income or assets from opening a credit card account despite the
fact that the consumer has access to (but not an ownership
interest in) the income or assets of a spouse or other household
member.1 0
The implicit acknowledgment was that certain stay-at-home
mothers and other non-income-earning spouses may lack access
to the credit card market without their spouses' co-signatures."
107 Id.
108 Id.; see also Testimony of Gail Hillebrand, supra note 33, at 6, 10-11.
109 Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,948, 22,976 (Apr. 25, 2011),available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-04-25/pdf/2011-8843.pdf. The CFPB is
awaiting data on this point. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. However, it
has been pointed out that there are few credit card applications that ask for
"income" rather than "household income," and thus little evidence exists on this
question. J. Craig Shearman, NRF Says New Regulations Could Make Credit More
Difficult for Stay-at-Home Spouses, NAT'L RETAIL FED'N (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Newsletter&op=viewlive&sp-id=324&id=51.
no Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
ni See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.B.
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However, there are exceptions to the Board's "ability to pay"
rule if "the spouse or household member is a joint applicant or
accountholder or state law grants the applicant an ownership
interest in the income of his or her spouse.""2 This latter
exception applies only in the nine community property states,
wherein non-income earning spouses can open sole-account credit
cards, because they own part of their spouses' income according
to the states' matrimonial property regimes."'
The remainder of American non-income-earning spouses-in
the majority of states-must establish a joint credit card with
their income-earning spouses, because they have no ownership
interest in spousal income.114 According to the Board, in these
common law states, "a consumer without independent income or
assets could still open a credit card account by applying jointly
with a spouse or household member who has sufficient income or
assets.""' Yet, the Board reasoned that its approach provides a
"single, consistent standard for evaluating a consumer's ability to
pay," in addition to being consistent with the intent of TILA
section 150, as added by the CARD Act."'
The proposed Board rules were published in the Federal
Register on November 2, 2010.n? The Board held a comments
period until January 3, 2011,"s soliciting "comment on whether it
would be appropriate to provide greater flexibility in these
112 Truth in Lending, supra note 89. State law "grants the applicant an
ownership interest in the income of his or her spouse" in community property states,
where, by statutory default, ownership of marital property is shared equally by the
spouses regardless of which spouse acquired the property. See id.; Alicia Brokars
Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongoing Spousal
Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 156 (2008); infra notes 143-47
and accompanying text. Therefore, "[ilf the consumer and the spouse reside in a
community property state where state law grants the consumer joint ownership of
income or assets acquired by the spouse during the marriage, the income or assets
are considered the consumer's income or assets for purposes of the § 226.51(a)
analysis." Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
113 See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
1' See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
n" Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
116 Id.
n1 Id. at 67,458.
11 Id. For some of the publicly available comments, scattered throughout the
Federal Register, on the proposed rules, see Truth in Lending, supra note 89; see
also supra note 95 and accompanying text; infra notes 161, 201, 211, 219 and
accompanying text.
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circumstances."119  Despite numerous comments urging
reconsideration of the proposed rules,120 the Board did not change
the rules on this topic, and they went into effect on October 1,
2011.
Upon its establishment on July 21, 2011, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau inherited the Board's rules. 12 1
Certain members of Congress, including principal authors of the
CARD Act, have called on the CFPB to study and report the
impact of the Board's "ability to pay" rule, particularly on non-
income-earning spouses. 12 2 The Board has agreed that such a
study would be helpful in assessing the "unintended
consequences" of the rule.123 In a June 6, 2012 hearing of the
House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit, the CFPB Associate Director
testified that the agency had recently requested card issuers to
share data regarding the actual impact of the Board's "ability to
pay" rule.124 The Associate Director also testified that the CFPB
held a public comments period in the first half of 2012.125
Contributing to the public comments, a stay-at-home mother
delivered to the CFPB over 30,000 signatures petitioning against
119 Truth in Lending, supra note 89.
120 See, e.g., Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1419, 1422-26.
121 Press Release, Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Reps. Maloney,
Slaughter, Bachus, and Frank Call on CFPB to Study Impact of Credit CARD Act's
"Ability to Pay" Rules (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://maloney.house.gov/press-
release/reps-maloney-slaughter-bachus-and-frank-call-cfpb-study-impact-credit-
card-act's-. For background on the CFPB, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
For questions regarding the authority of the CFPB to make any binding decisions
given the controversial appointment of its director, see Videotape: Holding the CFPB
Accountable: Review of First Semi-Annual Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Sen. Mike
Johanns), available at http-I/banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Hearings.Hearing&HearingID=82edc25b-2459-4806-9a30-aOlbdc24da8b. However,
the CFPB may, at some point, lose power over the Board's rule. See supra note 33.
122 Press Release, Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney, supra note 121.
123 Id.
124 Testimony of Gail Hillebrand, supra note 33, at 7.
125 Id. at 6.
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the rule.126  Despite this public concern, however, the Board's
"ability to pay" rule bars non-income earning spouses from the
credit market.127
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S RULE AND
THE LAW'S TRADITIONAL TREATMENT OF SPOUSES AS AN
ECONOMIC UNIT
The Board's "ability to pay" rule must be reviewed for several
reasons. Chief among them is that the rule problematically
conflicts with several principles deemed important in society and
law, including the typical treatment of the spouses as one
economic unit. Many areas of law treat the spouses in this
way,128 but especially family law. The notion of the spousal
economic unit in family law is evidenced by the duty to support
one's spouse, the doctrine of necessaries, the principles governing
matrimonial property, and property division upon divorce, which
treats spouses' income as marital property.129
In light of lawmakers' and the public's demands for the
CFPB to study the effects of the Board's rule,'10 any consideration
of the rule should be mindful of the law's traditional treatment of
the spouses as a single economic unit. This is particularly
important given that such treatment provides spouses with a
certain measure of financial independence and protection
facilitated by pooling economic resources without consequence;
during the marriage, spouses may rely on each other financially,
and after the marriage, such reliance is not penalized. In
addition to negatively impacting the spousal unit, however, the
Board's bar on such pooling affects women disproportionately.
126 Blake Ellis, Stay-at-Home Mom Fights New Credit Card Rule, CNNMONEY
(May 16, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/16/pf/credit-cards-stay-at-home-moms/
index.htm.
127 See supra Part II.B.
128 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.
129 See infra Part II.A.
'o See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
931
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
A. The Spouses as an Economic Unit
Spouses have long been treated as a single economic unit
under the law .13 The inconsistency of this policy with the
Board's stance makes the "ability to pay" rule not only
surprising, but also difficult to accommodate in households
otherwise legally permitted-and even incentivized-to have one-
income earners.
The reasons for the law's treatment of the spouses as an
economic unit are numerous and varied. Importantly, this
treatment minimizes the consequences of a spouse's decision to
enter or leave the labor market. For example, one spouse is able
to accommodate the family's needs through care-taking roles,
such as by leaving the work force to have and raise children,
without being jeopardized economically.'3 2 Approximately one-
third of married couples in the United States have such an
arrangement, with only one spouse in the labor force,13 3 which is
financially feasible partially due to the law's typical treatment of
the family as a single economic unit.
While it is true that there are more married couples without
minor children than with minor children, and there are benefits
to a more neutral legal regime, many current areas of law favor
the treatment of spouses as a single economic unit, often for
child-caring purposes.134 For example, most married couples
131 See, e.g., Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation:
Manifestations of Probate's Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411,
421 (2009) (noting the treatment of family as a single unit in intestacy laws); Kerry
A. Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 268 (2010)
(noting the treatment of family as a single unit in tax law); Benjamin Shmueli, Tort
Litigation Between Spouses: Let's Meet Somewhere in the Middle, 15 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 195, 205 (2010) (noting the treatment of the family as a single economic unit
in torts law).
132 See, e.g., Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Law Left Out Low-Income Workers,
28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2007) ("This catchphrase [the "Opt-Out
Revolution"] is used to describe highly educated professional women who have
chosen to leave their jobs to care for their children or to arrange reduced work hours
to have more time at home."); see also Joyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin,
Effects of Intermittent Labor Force Attachment on Women's Earnings, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Sept. 1995, at 14, 16 ("Women who leave the work force are more likely to be
married and to have children than are their counterparts who remain in the work
force."). On the other hand, abstaining from paid work often diminishes human
capital. See infra note 179.
133 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3, at tbl. FG1.
134 The number of married women without minor children slightly exceeds those
with such children: There are currently 33,059,000 married couples without children
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benefit from filing jointly under the federal income tax code."a'
The federal tax code even incentivizes single-income earning
couples through the marriage penalty, which results from the
lack of double taxation brackets upon marriage and adversely
affects many two-income earning couples to the benefit of single-
income earning couples.136
Furthermore, trusts and estates law has many defaults that
benefit the nuclear family. This includes intestacy laws that
favor inheritance to the nuclear family,13 as well as most states'
elective share statutes that protect a spouse from disinheritance
by allowing that spouse to forego an unfavorable will for a
statutorily-determined portion of the estate.'
Perhaps the most compelling treatment of the spouses as a
single economic unit is in family law. For example, there is a
duty to support one's spouse;'3 9 this is one of most notable
differences between marriage and cohabitation. In marriage, the
courts may require one spouse to pay a fair and reasonable sum
for the other spouse's support, having due regard to the
circumstances of the respective parties. 40 Additionally, there is
the doctrine of necessaries in family law, which stems from the
English common law duty of a husband to provide for the
necessary expenses of his wife and child.' 4 ' Under this doctrine,
the seller of goods to one spouse may charge the other spouse if
the goods are necessary for the beneficiary.'4 2
under eighteen, as opposed to 26,469,000 married couples with minor children. Id. at
tbl. FG3; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text. For the benefits of neutral
laws, see Ryznar, supra note 10, at 938-41.
135 See Ryznar, supra note 10, at 938-41.
136 Id.
m37 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 73-75 (8th ed.
2009).
138 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 386-87 (7th ed. 2010).
139 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 412 (McKinney 2012) (citing a duty to support
one's spouse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (West 2012) (same).
140 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 412; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03.
141 See Forsyth Mem'1 Hosp., Inc. v. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d 88, 89 (N.C. 1996).
142 Susan Kalinka, Taxation of Community Income: It Is Time for Congress To
Override Poe v. Seaborn, 58 LA. L. REV. 73, 94 (1997) ("Under the doctrine of
necessaries, the earning spouse is responsible for payment of expenses incurred by
the nonearning spouse for those things that are necessary for the family.").
"Necessity" is determined by examining factors such as the spouses' "means, social
position, and circumstances." Id.
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Although these various family law principles do not mandate
that non-income-earning spouses must be able to open credit
cards in their own names, they do show the law's treatment of
the spouses as one economic unit. The most compelling case for
the treatment of the spouses as one economic unit, however, is
matrimonial property law, as well as divorce law when the courts
divide the spouses' property.
In these two areas of law, the nine community property
states view marriage as an economic partnership by considering
property held within a marriage to be jointly held by the spouses.
In these states, 14 3 marriage is treated as a partnership in which
the property and debts acquired during the marriage belong to
both spouses, most often, equally. 144 In other words, the income
earned by one spouse during the marriage is owned by both.14 5
Upon divorce, furthermore, some community property states
statutorily require equal division of the marital assets between
the spouses upon divorce,4 although the nuances differ among
community property states. The Board has noted that in these
states, non-income-earning spouses may count their spouses'
income as their own in credit card applications, due to
community property principles. 4 7
The remaining majority of American states utilize equitable
distribution in divorce, and spouses hold their property
separately during marriage.148 "The generally accepted theory of
equitable division likens the division of property upon divorce to
that of partnership dissolution. While each partner has a stake
in the partnership, all shares are not equal."149  However, if a
143 Community property is the default marital property regime in a minority of
states, which include Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Kelly, supra note 112, at 156 n.163; see also
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason To Revive an Old Rule,
53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 370 (2005-06).
144 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971).
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2550-56 (West 2012).
147 Truth in Lending, supra note 89; see also supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
148 See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 119-20.
149 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
OF PROPERTY § 8:1 (3d ed. 2005)).
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couple should divorce, the marital property is divided, and often
each spouse receives a portion of the marital property in
recognition of marriage as a partnership.5 o
In this majority of states, non-income earning spouses
cannot rely on their spouse's income in credit card applications.''
The Board's rule therefore creates a consequence in these
common law states for a spouse's decision to forego an
independent income in favor of relying on the household income:
no opportunity to open a sole-account credit card despite the vital
importance of access to this form of financial inclusion.'5 2 This is
inconsistent with the law's typical treatment of the family as a
single economic unit and incompatible with many households'
financial arrangements that rely on income-sharing between the
spouses.1
Interestingly, the Board's "ability to pay" rule ignores the
possibility that spouses may have changed their matrimonial
property regime through a premarital agreement.154  In some
jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, premarital agreements are
recorded in a public registry, such that creditors know the assets
of a loan applicant before lending. 55
Divorce law, regardless of the state's matrimonial property
regime, commonly treats marriage as a single economic unit. For
example, many courts in community property states divide
marital property equally between the spouses, while common law
states have been trending toward almost an equal division,
depending on factors such as the length of the marriage. 15  Both
approaches acknowledge that marital assets belong to both
150 See generally Ryznar, supra note 12.
1I Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95 ("The Board states that the consumer can always jointly
apply for the card. The Board also notes that in several community property states,
both spouses have a joint interest in all of the income and assets in a household and
can therefore use that joint interest when applying for credit cards. However, only
nine states in the U.S. are community property states, leaving that option available
to a small minority of American consumers.").
152 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-08 and
accompanying text.
15 See supra Part II.A.
154 See Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stgpiefi-Sporek, To Have and To Hold, for
Richer or Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L.
REV. 27, 31-32 (2009).
155 Id. at 50.
15 See Ryznar, supra note 12, at 119-21.
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parties, regardless of which spouse earned them.1 7  Indeed, it
would be rare in any jurisdiction for a stay-at-home mother or
homemaker to leave a marriage without any of the marital
assets.1 8  Therefore, creditors are protected because even if a
non-income earning spouse incurred credit card debt, and upon
divorce the court assigns the debt to that spouse, the non-income-
earning spouse would leave the marriage with assets to pay for
the debt." 9 Furthermore, after the divorce, the non-income-
earning spouse would have independent assets from the divorce
and possibly alimony-which is often determined by the marital
standard of living 60-to apply for a credit card. However, divorce
should not be the only way for the non-income-earning spouse to
list marital assets on a credit card application; the law should
acknowledge shared income well before a divorce.16 1
.. See id. at 119-20.
1s Id. at 125.
... For background on how courts divide debt between spouses, see generally
Margaret M. Mahoney, The Equitable Distribution of Marital Debts, 79 UMKC L.
REV. 445 (2010).
160 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (West 2012) ("As a general rule, the
court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage."); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201-02 (Fla. 1980)
(emphasis added) ("Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the
necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage
of the parties. The two primary elements to be considered when determining
permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for the funds and the ability
of the other spouse to provide the necessary funds. The criteria to be used in
establishing this need include the parties' earning ability, age, health, education, the
duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the
value of the parties' estates."). However, alimony may be becoming disfavored in
certain jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wendy Murphy, New Alimony Law Is Bad for Women,
CNN (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/opinion/murphy-
alimony-overhaul-con/index.html.
161 In a comment letter to the Federal Reserve Board, Bank of America has
argued that favoring divorced non-income earners over married ones is against
public policy. Comment Letter from Stacie E. McGinn, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Consumer & Small Bus. Banking, Bank of Am. Corp., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2 (Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/February/20110201/R-1393/R-1393_0103
11_59191_570778722245_1.pdf ("Ironically, if the non-working spouse were to
divorce, he or she would then be able to list any alimony to meet the independent
ability to pay test. So under the proposed rule, the non-working spouse is more
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In an intact marriage, on the other hand, the courts are
reluctant to become involved, and the spouses arrange their
finances privately. 16 2  In their private arrangements, many
households elect to income share-which the Board's "ability to
pay" rule does not recognize-likely due to the significant
benefits of income-sharing under other areas of the law.163 The
Board should also be respectful of people's choices if they do not
impact their credit-worthiness. 64
Finally, there are many nuances in property division upon
divorce that illustrate the entwined nature of the spouses'
property. For example, separate property may become marital
property by being commingled through joint spousal use.16 1
Illustrating this is a Rhode Island case in which the husband
inherited furniture from his father, with the inheritance making
it the husband's separate property. 16 6 He placed some of it in
storage and some of it in his marital home.'6 1 Upon divorce, the
court awarded him the furniture from storage, but the wife
received the furniture in the marital home because they used it
jointly.6 8 These family law principles illustrate how spouses are
treated as a single economic unit, which the Board's "ability to
pay" rule fails to do.
Some may argue that the Board's "ability to pay" rule in fact
does treat the spouses as one economic unit by requiring them to
co-sign for a credit card in common law property states.' 9
qualified for credit when divorced and dependent on alimony than when married and
maintaining a shared household. We believe that such as [sic] result would be
contrary to public policy, and contrary to the purpose of the Federal Reserve Board's
own guidance in section 202.10 of Regulation B.").
162 For example, one married couple could not agree on the education of the child
and brought the case to court, but the Alabama Supreme Court held that it had no
jurisdiction in "the settlement of a difference of opinion between parents as to what
is best for their minor child when the parents and child are all living together as a
family group." Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888-89 (Ala. 1958), superseded by
statute, ALA. CODE § 30-3-151(2) (2012).
'6 See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
16' See J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 219, 226 (1989).
16 Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 850 (R.I. 1986).
167 Id. at 850-52.
'6 Id. at 851.
169 For background on common law states, see supra notes 148-53 and
accompanying text.
937
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
However, the Board's rule does not require a non-income-earning
spouse to co-sign with an income-earning spouse, just vice versa.
Therefore, the rule shifts the bargaining power to the income-
earning spouse, and the spouses are not treated as an economic
unit because the economic power between them is different.17 0
The conflict between the Board's rule and family law
principles is problematic for more than theoretical reasons:
Family law principles are developed to protect family members.
For example, the principles allow spouses to pool their resources
to more effectively form a family."' They also allow spouses to
leave abusive marriages without worrying about leaving all
property behind.'72 The Board's rule hinders these goals, not
only unfavorably treating the spouses, but also
disproportionately impacting women.
B. Women Under the Federal Reserve's Rule
It is true that the Board's "ability to pay" rule is facially
neutral in requiring that only the independent income of an
applicant, and not of the household, be considered by credit card
issuers.17 3 The arguments against the rule therefore implicate
not only wives without an independent income, but also
husbands without an independent income. 7 4 Even in households
with two income-earning spouses, income is often pooled and
shared between the spouses, yet the lower-income spouse may be
less credit-worthy under the Board's rule.'75
However, the Board's "ability to pay" rule impacts women
disproportionately because, in most households, it is the husband
that earns the sole, or more substantial, income. In
approximately 22.4% of all married couples, only the husband
participates in the labor force.7 6 Meanwhile, only in 6.43% of
170 This is particularly an issue in abusive family situations. See supra notes 20-
26 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
17n See supra Part II.A.
172 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text; infra notes 200-08 and
accompanying text.
173 See supra Part I.C. But see infra notes 174-78, 196-99 and accompanying
text; Part III.A.2.
174 The arguments particularly apply to military members, military spouses,
and retired people. See supra note 4.
175 Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1423-24.
176 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3.
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households is it the wife who is the sole-income earner.177 Among
those employed, men continue to outearn women in the labor
force. 171
Women are often the non- or lesser-income earning spouse
due to parenthood. 7 9  Women, to accommodate their children,
take part-time and flexible jobs more frequently than men. 8 o
Furthermore, maternity leave is far more popular and
institutionalized than paternity leave.' 8' The decision to
177 See id.; see also Debra DiMaggio, The "Prodigious Spouse": Equitable
Distribution and Wealthy Wage Earner, 91 ILL. B.J. 460, 464 (2003) ("The stereotype
of the nonwage-earning spouse is a woman who does not work outside the home.
However, increasing numbers of women are the heads of household and even more
women work outside the home.").
178 See infra note 182. The wife out-earns the husband in only about a quarter of
married households. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHARTING
THE U.S. LABOR MARKET IN 2006, chart 6-5 (2007), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2006/chartbook.pdf. Although more men than women
lost jobs in the economic recession beginning in 2007, men have recovered jobs more
quickly than women. Deborah L. Jacobs, "Mancession" Fades as More Men Than
Women Find Jobs, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
deborahljacobs/2011/12/06/economic-recovery-is-gender-biased-study-suggests/.
179 For a summary of the labor market challenges mothers face, including lower
wages, see Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1359, 1361 (2007). On the other hand, abstaining from paid
work often diminishes human capital. See Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 132, at 14
("First, women who leave the labor force and later re-enter do not build up seniority,
which, by itself, often leads to higher wages. Second, women who return to the labor
force are less likely to receive on-the-job training to increase their productivity and
thereby raise their pay. Third, when women are not in the work force, their job skills
may depreciate. Finally, employers may view gaps in work history as a signal that
women who leave may do so again.").
180 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., Dynamics- of the Gender Gap for Young
Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON.,
July 2010, at 228, 230-31 (finding that many women curtail their work after having
children); Marin Clarkberg & Phyllis Moen, Understanding the Time-Squeeze:
Married Couples' Preferred and Actual Work-Hour Strategies, 44 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1115, 1133 (2001) (noting that women, not men, typically prefer part-time
work); Alex M. David, New York City Bar, Law Firm Diversity Benchmarking
Report: 2006 Report to Signatories of the Statement of Diversity Principles, in
BEYOND DIVERSITY 101: NAVIGATING THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES 213, 235 (2008)
(determining that over nine percent of New York City women attorneys work
flexibly compared to about one percent of men).
181 See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003)
(summarizing the workplace expectation that women bear the burden of caring for
the family); Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 743-44 (S.D. Iowa 2004)
(determining that an employer's differential treatment of biological fathers and
mothers was justified when work leave was characterized as being for disability
related to pregnancy, not for caregiving), affd, 431 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2005).
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temporarily or permanently leave the workforce, however, is
reflected in women's wages and earning power, which have
historically been lower than men's. 8 2
In addition to these indirect effects of motherhood, women
have historically faced many impediments to economic
participation. For instance, their ability to contract has been
virtually non-existent in much of American history, and women's
achievement of full contractual rights is relatively recent.'8 3 In
Texas before 1911, for example, women could not enter into
contracts at all, except through the necessities doctrine.1 8" Even
in the 1950's, women in Texas had limited contract rights, with
the district court only able to remove a woman's disability to
broaden her contractual powers for mercantile and trading
purposes "to the extent of those possessed by a feme sole."'8 5 One
commentator in Texas noted in 1956, "Probably the best course of
action would be to abandon our medieval attitude toward the
rights and powers of married women and ... giv[e] a married
woman full contractual capacity."' 6
182 In 2007, women earned 77.8 cents for every dollar men earned. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: PEOPLE tbl. P-40,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/people/.
Furthermore, in a recent study on the earnings of MBA graduates, researchers
found that the major difference in earnings between males and females was caused
by several factors, including career interruptions and the difference in hours per
week worked between the two groups, with women curtailing their work
contributions after having children. Bertrand et al., supra note 180. Of course, this
does not mean than men outearn their wives in every case. See supra note 178.
18 Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in
Divorce: New York's Reluctance To Enter the Fray, 10 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 29, 30-31
(2002); Peter D. Edgerton, Comment, Banishment and the Right To Live Where You
Want, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1023, 1034-35 (2007). For a background on the legal
constraints that faced women, see Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving
the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 229, 252-57 (1996). In terms of women's modern ability to contract,
the current debate is mostly restricted to bioethics issues, such as whether women
can contract into or out of motherhood in assisted reproduction, including in the case
of surrogacy. See, e.g., Mairead Enright, Dispositional Contracts and Frozen
Embryos: Right for Women?, 12 MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 28, 31-32 (2006).
'8 John A. Ward III, Note, Husband and Wife-Contracts-Married Woman Not
Liable on Mercantile or Trading Contract Unless Disability of Coverture Removed, 34
TEX. L. REV. 1094, 1094 (1956); see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
185 Ward, supra note 184.
18 Id. at 1096.
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In light of this history, it is even more surprising that the
Board promulgated a rule that significantly erodes many
women's ability to contract for a credit card. This is especially
true given that there is no evidence that stay-at-home mothers
and homemakers are more likely to default on their consumer
loans than others.87
The tendency for women to remain outside the economy and
their historical lack of contract rights, especially in economic
matters, have been denounced and rejected by nearly all other
segments of American society.188 Additionally, there has been a
major international push for the financial inclusion of women in
financial matters. 89  In fact, some commentators, both
domestically and internationally, have categorized economic
abuse in relationships as a form of domestic abuse."9 o Yet, under
the Board's "ability to pay" rule, the income earning spouse can
block the access of the non-income-earning spouse to the credit
card market.191
This bar on many women's access to the credit card market
is problematic not only for women, but also for the economy.192
For example, such a bar limits women's ability to participate
fully in the economy by hampering their opportunity to open
small businesses.'9 3 The bar also ignores that women have major
purchasing power and compose a major portion of consumers,
especially at department stores that have their own lines of
187 See Covert, supra note 6 (recounting one woman's experiences attempting to
open a credit card in 1973 without her husband as a co-signer); supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text; infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
's See, e.g., infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
189 Jonathan Sibley & Jeff Liew, Financial Inclusion in the Pacific: Women's
Financial Inclusion Significantly Improves Household Wellbeing, PAC. FIN.
INCLUSION PROGRAMME (PFIP) NOTES SERIES (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.undppc.org.fjLresources/article/files/PFIP%20Note%20-%20Womens% 2 0
Financial%201nclusion.pdf.
190 See, e.g., Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic
Violence, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 40 (noting this concept domestically); Vyas,
supra note 21, at 204 (noting this concept internationally).
191 See supra Part I.C.
192 See infra note 236 and accompanying text. However, "[tihe National
Consumer Law Center (NCLC), joined by other consumer groups, commented in
favor of the [rules], claiming that credit card issuers should be required to only
factor in the ability to pay of those consumers liable on the account." Williams &
Emley, supra note 4, at 1425. For other arguments in favor of the rules, see id. at
1425-26.
193 Suarez, supra note 1.
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credit. 94 As Congresswomen Maloney and Slaughter stated in
response to the Board: "While stay-at-home moms may not be
contributing to the market economy as workers, they make the
majority of the day-to-day financial decisions on behalf of their
household. Women's consumer power represents 73 percent of
household spending, or over $4 trillion in annual discretionary
spending."195
Meanwhile, there is no evidence that non-income-earning
spouses default on their consumer loans more than others, and
the Board's "ability to pay" rule is not based on any empirical
evidence that non-income-earning spouses are high-risk
borrowers. 9 6 There is also no evidence that the soundness of the
credit card market requires barring non-income-earning
spouses.'97 Credit card companies, of course, would prefer no
regulation whatsoever, let alone the regulation of a major low-
risk market like non-income-earning spouses.9 8  The CFPB is
currently seeking data on some of these issues, which will add
concrete terms to the debate, although it may be difficult to tell
the effects of the Board's rule from the effects of the recession. 99
Perhaps most problematic, however, is that women might
have trouble leaving abusive relationships due to financial
reasons, and, once they leave, they may have trouble establishing
credit for themselves.200 Congresswomen Maloney and Slaughter
noted this concern in their letter to the Board:
[RIequiring married women to have their own earnings in order
to qualify for credit represents a serious risk for women in
abusive domestic partnerships. Women trapped in abusive
marriages may be unable to work due to a controlling spouse, a
hallmark of relationships characterized by domestic violence.
19 See Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95.
195 Id.
196 Id. ("Many stay-at-home moms have a strong work history, yet the proposed
regulations ignore their demonstrated credit-worthiness because of their lack of
current market income."); see also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
198 See Williams & Emley, supra note 4 ("Card issuers are more concerned with
whether cardholders have access to repayment funds than whether they earn their
own income or have independent assets."); see also id. at 1423; supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text; infra note 236 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.
200 Pollet, supra note 190, at 41.
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The availability of an independent credit card may represent
her best chance at establishing independence and a path out of
a dangerous relationship. By not allowing these women to
apply independently for a credit card, the proposed regulations
represent a significant-and potentially dangerous-set-back.2 0'
However, even during an amicable marriage separation, the
non-income-earning spouse may need to rely on the marital
credit before receiving part of the marital property.2 02
Meanwhile, during marriage, homemakers with military spouses
need access to credit card markets.2 0 3
Importantly, financial independence is self-perpetuating,
with the proper use of a credit card building credit.0 In a
society with high divorce rates, 205  and among a widowed
population that includes more women than men,"20  it is
important for both spouses to build their credits separately.2 07
This is especially important given that credit cards are viewed as
a desirable alternative to high-cost lenders such as pawn shops
and rent-to-own stores.2 08
In sum, the treatment of women by the Board on this issue is
unfavorable. Women are disproportionately affected by the
Board's "ability to pay" rule because their income is more likely
201 Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95. For another argument regarding the situation of women in
abusive family situations under the Board's "ability to pay" rule, see Comment
Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President & Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Regulatory
Compliance, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass'n Comment],
available at http//www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/February/20110201/R-1393/
R-1393_01031159193_570782784823-1.pdf.
202 In some divorce cases, the income-earning spouse may be required to pay for
the legal fees of a non-income-earning spouse. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
203 Press Release, Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, supra note 23.
204 See Jekot, supra note 24 ("[Tlhe use of a credit card builds a credit history
and credit score which are required to qualify for other types of credit such as a
mortgage or a car loan."). Conversely, the improper use of a credit card lowers one's
credit rating. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 215-16.
205 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., Jennifer Jones, Around the Globe, Women Outlive Men,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (AugiSept. 2001), http://www.prb.org/Articles/
2001/AroundtheGlobeWomenOutliveMen.aspx.
207 Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1425 ("[M]any consumer advocates have
warned against individuals combining their credit profiles.").
20 Littwin, supra note 45, at 405. However, these forms of credit may not be
perfect substitutes for each other. Id. at 425-26.
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to be affected by parenthood and other caregiving activities. This
is precisely one of the reasons that married couples are treated as
one economic unit by many areas of law: to recognize the non-
income-earning spouse's contributions to the household.
Additionally undermining the Board's rule are constitutional
concerns, such as equal protection, as well as potential statutory
challenges concerning congressional intent, considered next.
III. LEGAL INFIRMITIES OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S RULE AND
POTENTIAL REMEDIES
The law's frequent treatment of the family as one economic
unit is at odds with the Board's view of household finances,
which would result in the bar of a significant contingent of
women from the credit card market. In addition to being
problematic for these women and the economy,209 the rule may
exceed congressional intent and pose equal protection concerns.
Non-income-earning spouses negatively impacted by the
Board's rule may choose to litigate the "ability to pay" rule based
on statutory, constitutional, and public policy arguments. People
have already started attempting to persuade the CFPB and
Congress to amend the rule.2 10 There are two simple
amendments that can redress these problems: either including
age limits or specifying which family members may count
household income as their own.
A. Potential Defects
There may be certain statutory interpretation issues and
constitutional concerns undercutting the Board's "ability to pay"
rule. Among these are that the rule may exceed congressional
intent and pose equal protection concerns.
1. Statutory Interpretation Issues
One of the principal problems with the "ability to pay" rule is
that the Board may well have exceeded congressional intent in
interpreting the CARD Act and TILA. This is the argument of
209 See supra Part II.B.
210 See supra notes 118, 125-26 and accompanying text. See generally Letter
From Reps. Carolyn B., Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J. Johnson, supra
note 95.
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two principal authors of the CARD Act, who, in response to the
proposal of the rule, wrote to the Board that they "believe the
Fed's proposal goes beyond the intent behind both the specific
provisions and the law itself."2 1 1 If the courts agree, then the
"ability to pay" rule could be successfully challenged under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."'
According to Chevron:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.
. . . [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.213
It is unclear whether the Board's "ability to pay" rule would
withstand this analysis.
The explicit purpose of the CARD Act is "[t]o amend the
Truth in Lending Act to establish fair and transparent practices
relating to the extension of credit under an open end consumer
credit plan."2 14 Notably, the CARD Act did not isolate any group
of people-other than young people in title III, for whom
household credit must be excluded in credit card applications.
The stated intention of title III of the CARD Act-entitled
"Protection of Young Consumers "-is to protect young people
from deceptive and predatory credit card practices.2 15
211 Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95. For another argument using the CARD Act's legislative
history against the Board's "ability to pay" rule, see Comment Letter from Richard
Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Jennifer J. Johnson,
Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/February/20110208/R-1393/R-1393_0103
11_59189_5707771597151.pdf. See also supra Part I.C.
212 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
213 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnote omitted).
214 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
215 Wood, supra note 47, at 160, 163 (noting that, although students view credit
cards as helpful in building credit history, they do not understand credit card
nuances because they are new customers); see tit. III, 123 Stat. 1734 at 1747-49;
supra Part I.C.
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Title III of the CARD Act therefore restricts extending credit
to consumers under the age of twenty-one, decreases the ability
of credit card issuers to solicit students,2 16 protects students from
pre-screened offers, and imposes significant disclosure
requirements on universities.2 17 Most importantly, Congress
enacted title III of the CARD Act to specifically restrict credit
card lending to young consumers under the age of twenty-one by
requiring them to have an ability to repay credit card debt
independently of their parents.2 1 8
Notably, however, the sole placement of the "independent
ability to pay" language in the CARD Act is in title III, which
relates to young consumers under the age of twenty-one. 2 19 This
indicates that Congress intended for credit card issuers to
require an income independent of the household only for
consumers under the age of twenty-one. Congresswomen
Maloney and Slaughter, in their response to the Board, insist
that this was the intent of the CARD Act:
The original intent of the "ability to pay" requirement was to
ensure that underage consumers couldn't apply for credit cards
using their parents [sic] income without having a means on
their own to make payments on the card. Creating a uniform
standard for underage consumers and for spouses who do not
earn a salary goes beyond that intent. For this reason, we
believe that there should be two different standards for
assessing income, one for consumers under age 21 and one for
everyone else.220
In other words, Congress's intent in the CARD Act was to protect
young people from credit card risks, not to bar non-income-
earning spouses from the credit card market.
216 Wood, supra note 47, at 160; tit. III, 123 Stat. 1734. Previously, "[tihis heavy
marketing [was] demonstrated by the twenty-five to fifty credit card solicitations
students receiveld] per semester." Wood, supra note 47, at 163.
217 Wood, supra note 47, at 160; tit. III, 123 Stat. at 1747-49.
218 In its comment to the Board regarding the Board's "ability to pay" rule, the
American Bankers Association suggested that the CARD Act's distinction between
consumers under twenty-one and those over twenty-one is because younger
consumers are less mature and are less able to handle credit cards. Am. Bankers
Ass'n Comment, supra note 201.
219 See supra Part I.C.
220 Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95.
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The Board, however, essentially extended these restrictions
to all consumers, resulting in the potential bar on non-income-
earning spouses from the credit card market.2 21 By not
recognizing a higher level of protection for young consumers, the
Board's rule requires the same significant restrictions to the
access of credit for young adults as for non-income earning
spouses.
In sum, the only consumers explicitly and unambiguously
prevented by the CARD Act from relying on household income in
credit card applications are those under the age of twenty-one,
and any extension of this restrictive protection to all consumers
may exceed congressional intent. The Board's interpretation
may therefore be challenged in the courts under Chevron:
Litigants may argue that the intent of Congress was clear-to
establish two different standards for assessing income based on
age-and the Board did not give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.22 2 Alternatively, litigants may
argue that Congress's intent was ambiguous with respect to this
question, allowing a court to find that the Board's "ability to pay"
rule was not based on a permissible construction of the CARD
Act.223
2. Constitutional Concerns
There may be several equal protection concerns created by
the Board's rule as well-although they may be concerns, more so
than fatal constitutional defects. Although federal law generally
defers to state law characterizations of property,2 24 one concern is
the differing treatment of women in the nine community property
states from those in the remainder of the states. Specifically, the
former are able to open single-account credit cards due to access
to spousal income, while the latter are not.225
221 See supra Part I.C.
222 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see supra Part I.C.1.
223 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
224 Memorandum from Michael J. Montemurro, Branch Chief, Office of Assoc.
Chief Counsel, IRS, to Cheryl Sherwood, Dir., Campus Compliance Servs., IRS, and
Brady Bennett, Dir., Compliance, IRS (May 5, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1021050.pdf.
225 See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
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Previously, the federal tax code's different treatment of
households in community property states and those in common
law property states prompted public pressure to eliminate the
differential treatment, which the IRS did.226 Public outcry
regarding the "ability to pay" rule has started to mount as
wel122 7-perhaps more slowly because it does not affect the entire
household, as in a tax situation, but only the individual women
within the households, therefore impacting fewer people.
Furthermore, all non-income-earning spouses may not have yet
realized their restricted access to credit, as the Board's rule has
not been in effect for long.
Another constitutionally problematic aspect of the Board's
rule is its indirect impact on non-income-earning women-often
stay-at-home mothers and homemakers. Although the rule is
facially neutral, it disproportionately affects more women than
men. 22 8  However, this indirect result may not be entirely
sufficient for an equal protection challenge, as the Supreme
Court has previously applied the equal protection clause only to
actions with discriminatory intent.2 29
Nonetheless, while equal protection concerns may be
insufficient for judicial intervention-especially under the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance23 0 -they may be sufficient for
the CFPB to reconsider the Board's "ability to pay" rule.23 '
Meanwhile, lawsuits might be launched because the evaluation
226 The uproar regarding the differing treatment of households in community
and common law property states resulted in the Revenue Act of 1948, which
extended many of the tax advantages to all American households. JAMES H. BOYD ET
AL., WEST FEDERAL TAXATION: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 1-30 (William H.
Hoffman, Jr. et al. eds., 2008 ed.).
227 See supra notes 33, 118, 125-26 and accompanying text.
228 See supra Part II.B.
229 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976); Margo Kaplan,
"A Special Class of Persons": Pregnant Women's Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
after Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 197 (2010).
230 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of.").
2321 See supra notes 33, 121-26 and accompanying text.
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of independent income under the Board's rule undermines the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B,232 which intend
to equalize access to the credit card market."3
While the Board's rule is therefore undermined by nuanced
and complex statutory and constitutional arguments, the remedy
can be simple but must correct the problem of barring non-
income-earning spouses from the credit card market.
B. Possible Remedies
Whether or not the Board intended to bar non-income-
earning spouses from the credit card market,2 34 such a reality has
emerged.2 3 5 The mere grant of permission for issuers to consider
household income for non-income-earning spouses would be
sufficient to solve the problem, prompting issuers to do so, as
"[wlomen's consumer power represents 73 percent of household
spending, or over $4 trillion in annual discretionary spending."2 36
Given this large consumer base, and no evidence that women
cost-prohibitively default on credit card loans,237 credit card
issuers would lose significant business in alienating women from
the credit card market.
Such a grant of permission can take the form of a simple
amendment: The Board's "ability to pay" rule should be amended
to require, or at least permit, credit card issuers to take into
232 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006 & Supp. IV
2010); Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity), 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.16 (2012).
233 Williams & Emley, supra note 4, at 1428.
234 This unintentional problem would not be the only unintended consequence of
the legislation. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 71, at 32 (noting that the CARD Act
required that loan statements be sent to consumers at least twenty-one days in
advance of the loan's due date-a requirement that applied not just to credit cards
but to all open-ended loan accounts, thus creating compliance problems for some
credit unions).
235 See supra Part II.B.
236 Jeff Landers, Even Affluent Women May No Longer Be Eligible for Credit
Cards, FORBES (May 10, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/
2011/05/10/even-affluent-women-may-no-longer-be-eligible-for-credit-cards (quoting
Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J. Johnson,
supra note 95).
23 See Letter From Reps. Carolyn B. Maloney & Louise Slaughter to Jennifer J.
Johnson, supra note 95 ("Many stay-at-home moms have a strong work history, yet
the proposed regulations ignore their demonstrated credit-worthiness because of
their lack of current market income.").
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account the household income of non-income-earning spouses.
Whether prompted by litigation, such amendment may occur
either by the action of the CFPB" or Congress.3
The amendment can take various forms. Chief among them
are an age limit embedded in the "ability to pay" rule or a
specification of the members of the family for whom household
income may be counted.
In regards to the first solution, the Board had considered a
twenty-one-year-old age limit on its most restrictive provisions
but rejected it in the November 2010 clarifications, due to its
interpretation of the congressional framework.24 0 This rejection
should be reconsidered, and an age restriction should be imposed,
so as to align with title III of the CARD Act, which itself is
restricted to young consumers below the age of twenty-one.24 1
Adult credit card consumers would remain unaffected by title III
while remaining protected by the remainder of the CARD Act,
which does not require independent income for a credit card
application.
If an age limit amendment is not considered, a second and
more effective solution is to explicitly exempt spouses from
having to show income independent of the household on credit
card applications, allowing them to rely on spousal income. This
solution would more clearly recognize a married couple as a
single economic unit and align with many other areas of law that
do so. 24 2 Also, married young people under the age of twenty-one
could income share. The Independent Community Bankers of
America advocates this type of resolution as well, supporting a
"legislative discussion draft which would amend the Truth in
Lending Act to provide that, in the case of a married consumer, a
238 See Testimony of Gail Hillebrand, supra note 33, at 5-7 (explaining the steps
the CFPB has taken towards evaluating the current "ability to pay" rule and
amendments the CFPB has already made to the Board's regulations of the CARD
act); supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
239 See Press Release, Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, supra note 23 ("If
legislative action is necessary, we stand ready to act.").
240 See Truth in Lending, supra note 89; supra Part I.C.
241 See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, tit. III, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-51 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
242 See supra Part II.A.
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card issuer must consider the ability of the consumer and the
consumer's spouse, jointly, to make minimum payments under
the card agreement."2 43
Under either of these proposed solutions, married non-
income earners would be protected from title III's strictest
restrictions on access to the credit card market. This result
would better align with the legislative framework underpinning
the CARD Act, as well as with American public policy and law
recognizing the family as a single economic unit. Fortunately,
the CFPB Associate Director has recently indicated the agency's
willingness to consider a remedy, noting that "[cloncerns have
been raised about the impact that th[e] rule could have on the
availability of credit for those who are not employed outside the
home" and that the CFPB is "evaluating the regulation that [it]
inherited from the Federal Reserve Board."2" However, until
action is taken, married non-income earners remain barred from
access to the credit card market.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the economic recession beginning in 2007 impacted
much of American society, from individuals to entire industries.
One result has been the congressional enactment of massive
regulations targeting the financial services industry. Included in
these was the CARD Act, which aimed to regulate the credit card
market.
The Federal Reserve Board's interpretation and
implementation of this congressional legislative framework,
pursuant to congressional authority, has resulted in an "ability to
pay" rule that would require credit card issuers to consider only a
person's independent income, and not the household's income,
when underwriting credit cards. However, in addition to keeping
credit cards away from young adults-Congress's stated intent of
title III of the CARD Act-the rule problematically does the same
for a larger group of people: non-income-earning spouses,
constituted primarily of stay-at-home mothers and homemakers.
This negative impact of the rule on many women requires its
243 Access to Credit for Spouses Who Work in the Home, supra note 16.
244 Testimony of Gail Hillebrand, supra note 33, at 6-7. For additional suggested
remedies, see id. But see supra note 33 (discussing how several recently filed
lawsuits could decrease the agency's power over the Board's rule).
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reconsideration, particularly in light of the historical exclusion of
women's participation in economic affairs, which was rejected
long ago in American society and law.
Many of the inequities women have encountered, including
the newest one that bars them from the credit card market, have
stemmed from their erratic presence in the labor market due to
childbearing and rearing. However, the more usual treatment of
the family as a single economic unit has minimized the
consequences of their decision to enter or leave the labor market.
The Federal Reserve Board's rule contradicts this treatment of
the household as a single economic unit, creating negative
consequences for a spouse's decision to forego an independent
income in favor of relying on the household income. Specifically,
many of these non-income-earning spouses have no opportunity
to open a single-account credit card, despite the vital importance
of access to this form of financial inclusion.
This impact of the Federal Reserve Board's "ability to pay"
rule requires immediate attention and the CFPB, as well as
potential litigants, should heed calls for its review. The rule
should especially be reviewed in light of the possibility that it
may exceed congressional intent and pose equal protection
concerns and in light of the public policy reasons against the rule.
The solution may take the simple form of an amendment:
The rule can be amended to require, or at least permit, credit
card issuers to take into account the household income of
spouses. This can be done by imposing either an age or family
relations restriction on the "ability to pay" rule. In the
meantime, many married women who do not currently earn an
income will problematically be left without access to sole-account
credit cards.
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